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AbstrAct: The new legal framework created since 2014 while the new Code 
of penal procedure entered into force in Romania has opened a different 
way of approaching the justice in criminal matters. In such a legal context 
the judicial bodies are more accustomed with the idea of using the new 
means of technology in such a way not to infringe the parties’ procedural 
rights during the penal trial knowing the fact that using illegal protocols 
signed by the prosecutor offices with the Romanian Intelligence Service 
was prohibited by the Constitutional Court of Romania. In the current 
paper, a qualitative research has been carried out on both legislative and 
jurisprudence items regarding the new means of technologies currently 
used in the penal justice. The main purpose of the paper is to analyze the 
effect of the new means of technology including the use of digital evidence 
which occur in the penal trial in Romania as well as to discuss the legal 
consequences they produce in practice. Some practical points of view 
have been highlighted taking into account the new means of technologies’ 
efficiency. Moreover, in order to improve the penal procedure into force 
certain proposals of de lege ferenda have been provided. 
Keywords: means of technology; digital evidence; procedural issues; 
respecting parties’ rights; constitutional limitation.
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resumen:	El	nuevo	marco	jurídico	creado	en	Rumanía	en	2014,	con	la	
aprobación	de	un	nuevo	Código	de	procedimiento	penal,	ha	transformado	
la	forma	de	aproximación	a	la	justicia	penal.	En	este	contexto	jurídico,	
los entes jurisdiccionales se han ido adaptando a usar nuevos medios 
tecnológicos en el marco de los procedimientos penales sin infringir 
los	derechos	procesales	de	las	partes,	tras	la	prohibición,	por	parte	del	
Tribunal	Constitucional,	del	empleo	de	protocolos	ilegales	firmados	por	
las	fiscalías	con	el	Servicio	de	Inteligencia	de	Rumanía.	En	este	trabajo	se	
desarrolla	una	investigación	cualitativa,	que	analiza	materiales	legislativos	
y	jurisprudenciales,	sobre	los	nuevos	medios	tecnológicos	que	se	usan	en	la	
justicia	penal.	El	objetivo	principal	del	artículo	es	analizar	los	efectos	de	esos	
nuevos	medios	tecnológicos	empleados	en	el	procedimiento,	incluidas	las	
pruebas	digitales,	así	como	discutir	las	consecuencias	jurídicas	que	producen	
en	la	práctica.	En	este	sentido,	se	ponen	de	relieve	algunos	puntos	de	vista	
prácticos	que	destacan	la	eficiencia	de	los	nuevos	medios	tecnológicos.	
Junto	a	ello,	se	hacen	algunas	propuestas	de	lege	ferenda	para	mejorar	el	
procedimiento penal en vigor. 
PAlAbrAs-clAve:	medios	tecnológicos;	prueba	digital;	cuestiones	procesales;	
garantía	de	los	derechos	de	las	partes;	límites	constitucionales.	
resumo:	O	novo	quadro	legal	criado	em	2014,	quando	da	entrada	em	vigor	
do	novo	Código	de	Processo	Penal	na	Romênia,	deixou	aberta	uma	nova	
forma	de	aproximação	à	justiça	criminal.	Nesse	contexto	legal,	as	autori-
dades	judiciais	estão	mais	habituadas	a	usar	os	novos	meios	tecnológicos	
de	modo	a	não	infringir	os	direitos	processuais	das	partes	durante	o	julga-
mento,	sabendo	que	o	uso	de	meios	ou	protocolos	ilegais,	assinados	pela	
acusação	em	conjunto	com	o	serviço	de	informação	da	Romênia,	é	proibido	
pelo	Tribunal	Constitucional	da	Romênia.	No	presente	estudo,	analisam-se	
alguns	aspectos	dos	novos	meios	tecnológicos	que	são	atualmente	usados	
na	justiça	penal,	tanto	no	plano	legislativo	como	jurisprudencial.	O	propósito	
principal	deste	estudo	é	analisar	o	efeito	dos	novos	meios	tecnológicos,	
incluindo	a	prova	digital,	utilizados	em	julgamentos	criminais	na	Romênia,	
bem	como	discutir	as	consequências	legais	da	sua	utilização.	Alguns	aspetos	
práticos	foram	sublinhados	tendo	em	conta	a	eficiência	desses	novos	meios	
tecnológicos. Apresentam-se ainda algumas propostas de lege ferenda de 
modo	potenciar	a	realização	do	processo	penal.
PAlAvrAs-chAve:	meios	tecnológicos;	prova	digital;	questões	processuais;	
direitos	processuais;	limites	constitucionais.
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introduction
Romania has followed a well structured way determined by the 
judicial authorities’ goals to achieve the European general legal framework 
of reorganizing the entire judicial system in criminal matters in accordance 
with the democratic values since January 1, 2007 while it joined the 
European Union as a Member State. Nevertheless, that way was not a 
smooth one due to the fact that Romania is coming after a long and difficult 
transition period from the totalitarian regime to democracy and the rule 
of law principles. In this both social and legal context, it is relevant for 
the judicial authorities the European programs of harmonizing the home 
legislation in criminal matters to the European acquis. These efforts have 
been also made previously more particularly during the ante-adhesion 
period, but the real reformation of the judicial system in criminal matters 
started since 2007. From this reason, I appreciate the “judicial spring” has 
begun in 2014 once the Law no. 135/2010 on the new Code of penal 
procedure entered into force.2 Thus, the long time-period states a difficult 
itinerary but necessary in order for the Romanian authorities to reach 
the proposed scope. 
The new Code of penal procedure has the main role of regulating 
new judicial institutions, one of them leads with the implementation of 
the new means of technology in the justice in criminal matters. As it will 
be highlighted in the current paper, the new means of technology used 
in the investigation of penal cases created the opportunity to achieve 
the most appropriate procedure of solving the penal cases, on the one 
hand. On the other hand, there were some special techniques of criminal 
investigation that produced an interference in the parties’ fundamental 
rights exercised during the penal trial. They have been more reflected 
in the defendant’s procedural rights during the criminal proceedings. 
It is well known at the moment one of the objectives of the penal 
trial is that of implementing the digital world in the penal proceedings as a 
result of adapting the new legislation in the field of penal procedure law 
2 Law no. 135/2010 on the Code of penal procedure of Romania, published in 
the Romanian Official Journal no. 486 of 15 July 2010, entered into force on 
February 1, 2014.
1192 | MAghERESCU, Delia.
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, vol. 5, n. 3, p. 1189-1217, set.-dez. 2019.
to the contemporary social changes. For the Romanian judicial system 
in criminal matters it was very much a desideratum. Nevertheless, it is 
one of the legal ways of finding adequate solutions for the judicial and 
technical issues the judicial bodies are still confronted with.3 
In the field of jurisprudence, the main objective is that of 
harmonizing the modern technical means of investigation in the penal 
cases with respecting the participants’ fundamental rights during the penal 
proceedings. From this point of view, the doctrine has emphasized the 
idea of avoiding two issues both by the legislator and the judicial bodies 
called to apply the provisions of the Code of penal procedure in their 
activity of solving the penal cases. 
Thus, on the one hand the formalism of pronouncing the judicial 
solutions which are impossible to apply in practice must be avoided.4 On 
the other hand, the formalism of pronouncing practical and pragmatic 
solutions which do not assure respecting the fundamental parties’ 
rights as well.5 
In carrying out the current research paper, I analyzed the 
doctrinaire points of view as well as the jurisprudence references gathered 
from the law courts’ decisions pronounced in penal cases. They allowed 
me to point out some pertinent statements on the most relevant aspects 
the means of technology occur in the penal trial in Romania. 
1. digital EvidEncE: an ovErviEw 
During the investigation phase of the penal trial, the investigation 
bodies’ scope is that of gathering evidence in order to find the truth 
in the penal cases they were invested with. Actually, the scope of the 
investigation phase must be viewed in accordance with the scope of the 
entire penal trial due to the fact that the decision pronounced will reflect 
the truth if it is based on evidence. 
3 Suian, Mihai, Unele probleme privind folosirea probelor digitale în procesul penal, 
Bucharest: Doctrina si Jurisprudenta, No. 1/2019, p. 135.
4 Ibidem.
5 Ibidem.
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Featured as being a new concept of the penal trial6, the digital 
evidence becomes more associated with a defensive mechanism 
deploying by judicial bodies who pay their attention upon digital 
forensic investigation. Most of the time, the digital evidence is 
associated with cybercrime as a new type of evidences.7 Its main 
feature leads to the electromagnetic record the digital evidence 
exists on “easy to modify and copy, hard to understand the content 
directly without the conversion process, and not easy to retains the 
original state”.8
The process of adapting the legislation in the field of digital 
evidence is an international issue9 as a consequence the home legislation 
of penal procedure law is frequently out of date by the practical solutions 
regarding the legality of administering evidences or even investigating 
the crime scene in the digital area.10 
Administering the digital evidence during the penal proceedings 
in Romania is strictly approached due to the fact that the new Code of 
penal procedure of 2014 has failed in remedying the gaps the previous 
penal procedural legislation was confronted with. In spite of this 
inconvenient, the jurisprudence reacted and identified appropriate 
solutions. 
First of all, the judicial bodies have stated that the digital evidence 
is used in the penal cases having as object the serious crimes. The degree 
of their social danger is analyzed both from the point of view of the 
criminal means and modus operandi used by the defendants as well as 
from the point of view of the legal consequences produced because of 
6 Rekhis, Slim; Boudriga, Noureddine, Visibility: A Novel Concept for Character-
izing Provable Network Digital Evidences, International Journal of Security and 
Networks, No. 4/2009, pp. 234-245. 
7 Sun, Jia-Rong; Shih, Mao-Lin; Hwang, Min-Shiang, A Survey of Digital Evi-
dences Forensic and Cybercrime Investigation Procedure, Taichung: Interna-
tional Journal of Network Security, Vol. 17, No. 4/ 2015, p. 498. 
8 Ibidem. 
9 Suian, Mihai, op. cit., p. 135. 
10 Britz, Marjie T., Computer Forensics and Cyber Crime: An Introduction,New 
Jersey: Perason Education, 2013, pp. 26-28. 
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the crimes committed.11 Most of them occur in the digital environment 
or by technical means which involve a digital system. 
Secondly, the fundamental characteristic of the general theory 
of administering evidence in the penal trial is that of material feature 
of the means of evidence. In other words, digital evidence contains 
trances of committing offences, but they have an immaterial character 
due to the fact that they exist exclusively within the digital environment. 
Nevertheless, the only one way for the digital evidence to be administered 
in the penal trial is related to the traces of committing offences which 
must be stocked on an information support of stocking digital data. This 
means that the digital evidence must be sampled from an informatics 
system. This activity is provided to the forensics experts in the field of 
the information technology. 
By definition, the Code of penal procedure regulates the digital 
data as being “any representation of facts, information and concepts under 
an adequate form of processing it within an informatics system including 
a program which determines carrying out a function by an informatics 
system”.12 In accordance with the legislative definition, there are several 
critiques also occurred by doctrine. One of these has been pointed out by 
prof. Suian who stated the concept is not provided clearly enough, thus the 
digital data also mean “any representation of facts, information or concepts, 
which are recovered in an informatics system or on stocking support”.13
Thirdly, from the procedural point of view, in order to access 
the information system the digital data which must be used in the penal 
trial are stocked on, as well as to administer them the judge’s judicial 
authorization is necessary. The procedure is justified by the fact that 
through this method of forensics activity a series of encroachments in 
the individual’s right to private life is accomplished.14 This is a serious 
drawback as long as the right to the private life is established both by 
11 Miclea, Damian, Cunoasterea crimei organizate, Ploiesti: Pygmalion Publish-
ing House, 2001, pp. 153-249.
12 Article 138 (5) Code of penal procedure.
13 Suian, Mihai, op. cit., p. 136.
14 Udroiu, Mihail; Slavoiu, Radu; Predescu, Ovidiu, Tehnici speciale de investigare 
in justitia penala, Bucharest: C.H. Beck Publishing House, 2009, p. 3. 
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the European Convention on Human Rights15 and the European Court 
of Human Rights’ jurisprudence. 
In this respect, the European Court of Human Rights of Strasbourg 
pronounced several sentences against Romania because of the infringing 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights on respecting 
the right to the private life, such as Sentence of 21 April 2009: the case 
Raducu v. Romania16, Sentence of 28 September 2004: the case Sabou 
and Pircalab v. Romania17, Sentence of 30 June 2009: the case Burzo v. 
Romania18, Sentence of 16 July 2013: the case Balteanu v. Romania19. 
The Romanian Constitution also regulate the principle of 
respecting the right to the private life at the Article 26 thereof which 
devotes the individuals’ right to the private life. The public authorities 
are responsible for respecting the fundamental right as stated above as 
15 Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 safeguards 
the individual’s right to respect the private and family life and states that: 
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others”. Council of Europe, Cedex, Strasbourg. https://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf 
16 Sentence of 21 April 2009 of the ECHR, available online at: https://jurispru-
dentacedo.com/Raducu-c.-Romaniei-Interceptare-convorbiri-telefonice-Vi-
ata-privata.html (accessed on 16 May 2019)
17 Sentence of 28 September 2004 of the ECHR, published in the Official Journal 
of Romania, no. 484 of 8 June 2005, available online at: https://jurisprudenta-
cedo.com/Sabou-si-Pircalab-contra-Romania-Interzicerea-exercitarii-dreptu-
rilor-familiale-Condamnare-penala-Conditii.html (accessed on 16 May 2019) 
18 Sentence of 30 June 2009 of the ECHR, available online at: https://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22calmanovici%22],%22languageiso-
code%22:[%22RUM%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRAND-
C H A M BE R % 2 2 , % 2 2 C H A M BE R % 2 2 ] , % 2 2 i te m id % 2 2 : [ % 2 2 0 0 1 -
123471%22]} (accessed on 16 May 2019)
19 Sentence of 16 July 2013 of the ECHR, available online at: https://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22calmanovici%22],%22languageiso-
code%22:[%22RUM%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRAND-
C H A M BE R % 2 2 , % 2 2 C H A M BE R % 2 2 ] , % 2 2 i te m id % 2 2 : [ % 2 2 0 0 1 -
142106%22]} (accessed on 16 May 2019)
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well as their family right.20 Last but not least, the Code of penal procedure 
regulates at the Articles 138-153 thereof the chapter on the topic of 
special methods of surveillance and investigation in penal cases. Both 
the international and national legal framework provide the mechanism 
of derogation in exceptional situations. 
On the one hand, the special surveillance of people exercised 
by the law enforcement using special technical means is considered by 
doctrine as being a real encroachment in their right to the private life.21 
On the other hand, the common surveillance carried out in public places 
regarding the individuals’ activity during a short period of time does not 
mean entirely an encroachment in their private life as the European Court 
of Human Rights’ jurisprudence understands to state.22 
2. EncroachMEnts in thE individual’s right to thE privatE lifE
The new Code of penal procedure created ab initio the judicial 
investigation authorities’ possibility to sign protocols having as object the 
cooperation between the investigation bodies and the intelligence services’ 
officers. De facto, the last ones have been entitled to carry out specific 
acts of investigation by special means of technology provided outside 
the judge’s approval. A long period of time they were into force, till the 
beginning of 2016 while the Constitutional Court of Romania sanctioned 
them and decided upon their unconstitutionality and subsequently their 
illegality.23 The Constitutional Court emphasized that the systematic 
20 Article 26 of the Constitution of Romania republished in the Official Journal 
of Romania, no. 669 of 22 September 2003. 
21 Udroiu, Mihail; Slavoiu, Radu; Predescu, Ovidiu, op. cit., p. 7.
22 Sentence of 1 July 2008 of the ECHR: the case Calmanovici v. Roma-
nia, published in the Romanian Official Journal, no. 283 on 30 April 2009, 
available online at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%-
22calmanovici%22],%22documentcollectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAM-
BER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-122630%22]} (ac-
cessed on 16 May 2019)
23 Decision no. 51 of 16 February 2016 of the Constitutional Court of Romania, 
published in the Official Journal no. 190 of 14 March 2016, available online 
at: https://www.ccr.ro/files/products/Decizie_51_2016.pdf; Decision no. 
244 of 6 April 2017 of the Constitutional Court of Romania, published in the 
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gathering of information by the intelligence services officers regarding the 
defendants’ activity during the penal trial in particular in the investigation 
phase as well as recording them through the technical means of surveillance 
is an encroachment in the people private life. As a consequence, this kind 
of activity is performed through violation of the Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Actually, the Article 8 thereof permits 
the judicial authorities to derogate from this principle in special cases 
and for particular conditions expressly regulated by the Code of penal 
procedure. This means that the unique authority entitled to approve the 
technical surveillance during the investigation phase is the judge. Any 
other procedures parallel to the ordinary judicial procedure which would 
involve the other public law enforcement agencies have been declared 
unconstitutional. In this context, the only one question can be asked: what 
is happened with the judicial decisions pronounced previously which 
were based on these protocols? Do the decisions in penal cases produce 
consequences? Are they still into force? The answer cannot be a positive 
one due to the reason that has already stated earlier and provided by the 
Constitutional Court as well. The consequences of the illegal procedure 
adopted by the Romanian judicial authorities must be viewed in the penal 
procedure law’s low level of quality, the lack of its clarity and precision 
as well as the predictability and accessibility, which all in all created the 
premises for infringing the defendants’ procedural rights independent 
of their information.24
De iure, the encroachments exercised by the other public 
authorities, which are not legally entitled to carry out the investigation 
activity during the penal trial means a limitation of the defendants’ right 
to private life and must be subsequently prohibited by the Constitutional 
Court. In these cases, it imposed a constitutional limitation in accordance 
with the European Convention on Human Rights’ provisions and the 
Official Journal no. 529 of 6 July 2017, available online at: https://www.ccr.
ro/files/products/Decizie_244_2017.pdf (accessed on 16 May 2019)
24 Selea, Mircea Mugurel, Application of the art. 102 (2) and (3) of the Criminal 
Procedure Code in relation to special surveillance measures listed under the art. 
138 (1) (a) and (c) of the Criminal Procedure Code enforced before the publica-
tion in the Official Journal, Revista de Stiinte Politice, Craiova: Universitaria 
Publishing House, Issue no. 53/2017, pp. 104-110. 
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European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence. Nevertheless, the 
constitutional limitation is not an absolute one, thus the defendants’ 
surveillance can be decided by the judge in cases in which it is regulated by 
the penal procedure law, it is looking for a legitimate scope, it is necessary 
in a democratic society and it is proportionally to the proposed scope.25 
At the international level, doctrine has also been involved in 
finding solutions to warrants for videotape surveillance issuable despite 
the lack of statutory authority.26 On this topic, the author highlighted that 
the Constitution and the provisions of Code of penal procedure “permit 
electronic eavesdropping by wiretaps or mechanical listening devices pursuant 
to a special search warrant. No constitutional or statutory authority exists, 
however, for the issuance of warrants permitting videotape surveillance.”27 
This concept also leads to the defendants’ right to be informed 
upon request during the investigation phase on the evidence the judicial 
accusation is based on.28 Knowing this feature, the defendant will be 
advised by his advocate regarding the legal possibilities of defense29 as well 
as to combat the accusation by means of penal procedure law and propose 
evidence in defense. Otherwise, the restriction of defendant’s procedural 
rights during the investigation phase will be analyzed in accordance with 
the European provisions.30 Such conditions allow the European instance 
to appreciate the entire de facto circumstances of penal case as well as to 
restrain the infringement of the guaranteed right.31 This is because the 
European Convention in particular the Article 8 thereof refers especially 
to the encroachments came from the public state authorities. In this 
matter, both doctrine and the European jurisprudence pointed out that this 
25 Article 11 Code of penal procedure. 
26 Conners, Kerry B., Warrants for Videotape Surveillance Issuable Despite Lack of 
Statutory Authority, St. John’s Law Review: vol. 54, no. 4/1980, pp. 790-795. 
27 Idem, pp. 790-791.
28 Jaidev, Ms, Brady Ruling, 1963 U.S. Supreme Court: Sifting from being heard to 
open trial American and Indian Context, International Journal of Research, vol. 
05, Issue 01/2018, p. 1753.
29 Magherescu, Delia, Recunoasterea vinovatiei si aplicarea pedepsei, Bucharest: 
Hamangiu Publishing House, 2019, pp. 29-32. 
30 Idem, p. 6.
31 Udroiu, Mihail; Slavoiu, Radu; Predescu, Ovidiu, op. cit., p. 10.
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principle is also applied in cases in which there are encroachments came 
from the natural persons upon the individuals’ right as it is guaranteed 
by the European Convention. The syllogism consists in the fact that the 
state through its judicial authorities is obliged to protect their private file.32 
Doctrine also created a particular framework on the victims’ 
rights in criminal proceedings.33 An antagonistic issue arose in the cases 
in which defendants turn into victims of the judicial authorities because of 
the encroachments in their private life. The dual position of the defendant, 
as being also a victim in the penal trial, could be viewed as an unbalance 
between the goals of the investigation bodies and the serious human rights 
violations.34 Moreover, in the stated nexus, a paradoxical relation has been 
highlighted between penal trial and human rights.35 Francoise Tulkens 
explains ”the offensive role of human rights, which allows recourse to 
criminal remedies under the circumstances and conditions described 
above, inevitably entails other cascade effects in relation to the ECHR.”36
Interpreting the rules of penal procedure law, the encroachments 
in the defendants’ private life are related to those communications which 
are characterized by the presumption of confidentiality. From this point 
of view, certain theories can be advanced. One of them refers to the 
defendant’s intimate-familial area, which exceeds common criteria which 
involve identifying the confidential communications. The second theory 
is featured in close of the defendant’s nature of communications. It 
supposes more the subjective impact upon the defendant’s right to private 
life violation as well as increases his status of the victim of penal trial. As 
it has been already pointed out above, the victimization of defendant is 
actually made with the public authorities’ indirect consent. 
32 Trechsel, Stefan; Summers, Sarah J., Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 523-548.
33 Sanchez, Juan Carlos Ochoa, The Rights of Victims in Criminal Justice Proceedings 
for Serious Human Rights Violations, Brill/ Martinus Nijhoff, 2013, pp. 71-93. 
34 Ibidem.
35 Tulkens, Francoise, The Paradoxical Relatsh between Criminal Law and Hu-
man Rights, Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 9, Issue 3/2011, pp. 
577-595. 
36 Idem, p. 591.
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In opposition to the principles of the non-infringement of the 
defendants’ procedural rights during the investigation phase37, both theories 
are not exempted from criticisms. The first theory has the disadvantage 
of excluding from the defendants’ private life their communications held 
in a public place, while the second one uses the subjective element which 
is difficult to appreciate definitely.38 As a consequence, another criterion 
based on adequate theory must be provided which would determine a 
new feature of the presumption of confidentiality more suitable for the 
entire principles of penal trial. 
3. constitutional liMitation
Using discretionary the means of investigation a special attention 
upon the digital evidence has created the reaction of the Constitutional 
Court which decided on the exceptions of unconstitutionality of the Code 
of penal procedure. In this regard, a particular feature has been created 
upon Article 142 (1)39 and Article 14540 thereof. 
In relation to the first case, the Constitutional Court of Romania 
pronounced Decision no. 51 of 2016 on the admitting unconstitutional 
exception of Article 142 (1) Code of penal procedure. The Court stated 
that the legal provision infringe Article 1 (5) of the Constitution regarding 
the Romanian state, Article 20 on the international treaties regarding 
the human rights Romania is part of, Article 21 on the free access to 
justice, Article 53 on the restricting fundamental citizens’ rights and 
liberties as well as Article 6 and Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights which regulate the provisions on fair trial41 and the 
fundamental right on respecting private and family right. The Court 
also decided that the Code of penal procedure regulates expressly the 
37 Magherescu, Delia, op. cit., pp. 54-55.
38 Udroiu, Mihail; Slavoiu, Radu; Predescu, Ovidiu, op. cit., p. 20.
39 Decision no. 51 on 16 February 2016 of the Constitutional Court of Romania, 
published in the Official Journal no. 190 of 14 March 2016. 
40 Decision no. 244 on 6 April 2017 of the Constitutional Court of Romania, 
published in the Official Journal no. 529 of 6 July 2017.
41 Magherescu, Delia, op. cit., pp. 21-34.
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special means of investigation including the special methods of technical 
surveillance. Article 138 (1/a-e) Code of penal procedure enumerated 
those related to: intercepting the communications or any kind of long-
distance communication; accessing an informatics system; video-audio 
surveillance; localizing or surveying by technical means; obtaining 
data of the persons’ financial transactions. However, the Article 142 
(2) Code of penal procedure states that the prosecutor does execute 
technical surveillance or can dispose they may be executed by the police 
investigation officers or by the other specialized state’s bodies. 
Excepting the provisions of Article 142 (1) Code of penal 
procedure, there is no national regulation which provides the other 
state’s bodies to intercept or execute a technical surveillance warrant. 
As a consequence, such provision could be regulated only by ordinary 
law in a predictable and clear legal framework, but not by an “infra-
legislative legislation”42, such as the administrative one due to the fact 
that they are featured by a high degree of instability and inaccessibility. 
The special means of investigation are also more efficiently both for the 
person’s involved, the defendant, for the investigation bodies and for the 
courts of law. Otherwise, there is the danger of infringing abusively the 
fundamental citizens’ rights basically for the rule of law. In this regard, 
the constitutional standard of protecting private, family and intimate life 
as well as the correspondence secret impose that their limitation to be 
made in an appropriate legal framework which states expressly, clearly 
and predictably the qualified bodies to execute such activities which 
mean encroachments in the defendants’ private life. 
In accordance with the Constitutional Court’s decision, the judicial 
bodies invested by law with such abilities are the prosecutors and the 
judicial police investigation bodies.43 It does not permit to include in the 
Article 142 (1) Code of penal procedure provision the expression “the 
other specialized state’s bodies” which are not defined or specified within 
the Code or another ordinary law.
42 Decision no. 51 on 16 February 2016 of the Constitutional Court of Romania, 
published in the Official Journal no. 190 of 14 March 2016.
43 In conformity with Article 30 Code of penal procedure corroborated with 
Article 55 (5) thereof. 
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The second case occurs on the Constitutional Court Decision 
no. 244/2017 regarding the unconstitutional exception of Article 
145 Code of penal procedure invoked in Case no. 4821/1/2015 in 
front of the High Court of Cassation and Justice which opined that 
the technical surveillance included means of evidence that supposed 
serious encroachments in the defendant’s private life, right already 
protected by Article 26 and 28 of the Romanian Constitution. The 
High Court of Cassation and Justice appreciated that the verification 
of these means of investigation legality could be done exceptionally by 
incidental way in particular cases. In this context, the supreme court 
stated there is no legal provision which permits defendants to request 
the verification of legality of administering evidence in accordance 
with Article 340 Code of penal procedure. 
Constitutional Court emphasized that the unconstitutional 
exception invoked referred to the “rights and liberties judge’s conclusion 
pronounced on the means of technical surveillance cannot be appealed”. 
For this reason, the parties involved in a penal trial cannot appeal 
the conclusion pronounced by the judge of rights and liberties on 
the means of technical surveillance. The Court’s jurisprudence states 
that in principle the measure infringe the defendant’s procedural 
right or a legitimate interest he is entitled to intimate the court of 
law in order to invoke the damage suffered and remove it even if the 
procedure implies exercising appeal. As pointed out by the European 
Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence, from the point of view of 
the legal nature, the right to appeal provided by Article 13 European 
Convention of Human Rights is a subjective procedural right which 
guarantees the access to justice in front of the court of law that may 
reestablish the legal situation. 
Regarding the case of Romania, the Court’s decisions highlight 
that its jurisprudence in the matter of process remedy against the 
means of technical surveillance has known an evolution during the 
last period of time. Initially, the European Court of Human Rights 
observed that, in accordance with the home law, a person whose 
legitimate interests have been infringed by using technical means of 
investigation could request the court of law to declare illegality of 
the means of intercepting the private communications and obtain 
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compensations44. Subsequently, the European Court of Human Rights 
stated that Romania did not provide an example of the law courts’ 
jurisprudence which demonstrates the appeal efficiency in this matter. 
Moreover, the Court also stated that the civil appeal declared by 
entitled person to involve the state’s responsibility in order to obtain 
compensations does not permit a control of legality of intercepting 
the private communications and a decision to dispose destroying 
them. This means that there is no effective control in accordance 
with Article 8 of the Convention. 
In conclusion, in the field of the technical means of surveillance 
that really mean an encroachment in the defendants’ private life, an 
a posteriori control can exist in purpose to verify the legal conditions 
regulated and the modality of executing the technical surveillance 
warrant, as provided by Article 142-144 Code of penal procedure. Both 
the constitutional and European jurisprudence impose the positive state’s 
obligation having as object the regulation of “effective appeal” which allows 
removing possible infringements of the defendants’ fundamental rights 
and liberties. It is appreciated that in absence of such an appeal in the 
penal proceedings means a violation of the obligation, in particular of the 
Article 21 of the Constitution and Article 13 of the European Convention. 
Doctrine also has been involved in how these provisions suppose 
changing the nature of the defendants’ presumption of innocence while 
they are surveyed and how the legislator can rewrite the human rights 
and regulate the use of surveillance technologies in such a matter not 
to imply an encroachment in the defendants’ private life.45 The author 
points out that ”the widespread use of surveillance technologies and 
their huge technological potential emphasize the need to focus on the 
relationship between surveillance and the presumption of innocence. 
44 Sentence of 16 July 2013 of the ECHR: Case Balteanu v. Romania, available 
online at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22fulltext%22:[%22calm-
anovici%22],%22languageisocode%22:[%22RUM%22],%22documentcol-
lectionid2%22:[%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22],%22itemi-
d%22:[%22001-142106%22]} (accessed on 16 May 2019)
45 Galetta, Antonella The changing nature of the presumption of innocence in to-
day’s surveillance societies: rewrite human rights or regulate the use of surveil-
lance technologies?, Belfast: European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 4, 
No. 2/2013.
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The link between surveillance and the presumption of innocence is very 
close, considered that surveillance measures are deployed to control, 
detect, deter and prevent crime.”46 
As a consequence, using the special means of technological 
investigation by inappropriate state’s bodies other than the judicial ones 
turns into the erosion of the defendants’ presumption of innocence during 
the penal proceedings47 especially in cases in which the secret services 
use this kind of technology in executing the prosecutor’s decision. 
4.  particularitiEs of thE procEdurE involving digital 
invEstigation
The procedure in penal cases of digital investigation involves 
priory the informatics or digital search and the investigation of the “crime 
scene” of the informatics offences. The legal basis of the digital search 
is provided by the Code of penal procedure, Article 168 thereof. It is 
a conclusive forensic method which consists in investigating a digital 
system or a support that stocks information data in purpose to find and 
gather digital evidence necessary in solving the penal cases. The main 
purpose of digital search is given by drawing digital evidence – electronic 
information having conclusive value, preserving the digital data which 
contain traces of informatics offences in those cases in which there is 
the danger of losing or modifying them. 
The penal procedure of digital search presents the following 
characteristics:
- It represents a special technique of forensic investigation in 
criminal matters. Doctrine has appreciated the digital search alongside with 
accessing a digital system, regulated by Article 138 (1/b) and (3) Code of 
penal procedure represents encroachments in the defendants’ right to the 
private life, as it has been already pointed out in the previous section of 
the current paper. The procedure neither involves the penetration of the 
defendants’ domicile, nor excludes it. In accordance with the previous penal 
46 Ibidem.
47 Ibidem.
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procedural regulation, provided by Law no. 161/2003, the digital search was 
disposed beforehand taking the digital system within the domiciliary search. 
- The necessity to protect the defendants’ private life directs 
to imposing some additional guarantees in cases of digital search. The 
legislator has stated in such cases applying the same guarantees as in 
cases of domiciliary search. 
- The digital search is disposed in cases in which there are 
reasonable reasons for the investigation bodies to consider that the digital 
system or the support of stocking the digital data that is subject to the 
digital search contains digital evidence regarding the offence committed 
and the judicial measure is necessary and proportional to the proposed 
judicial purpose. 
Article 168 (1) Code of penal procedure regulates “digital system 
search or a support of stocking the digital data means the investigation 
method of discovering, identifying and gathering digital evidence stocked 
in a digital system materialized through technical means and adequate 
proceedings of assuring the integrity of such information therein”.
During the investigation phase, the competence in disposing the 
procedure of digital search belongs to the judge of rights and liberties 
who can admits the prosecutor’s request of carrying out the digital search. 
Procedural speaking, the prosecutor submits his request with the penal 
case to the judge of rights and liberties, who will decide immediately in 
the council room in the presence of the prosecutor. In cases in which the 
judge considers the request is founded will admit it and dispose allowing 
the digital search through issuing the search warrant. The decision is 
definitively and cannot be subject to appeal. 
The search warrant contains the legal elements, as provided by 
the Code of penal procedure. They consist in mentioning the scope it has 
been issued for; the digital system or the support of stoking the digital 
data which must be searched; the defendant’s name if known.
A particular situation could be arisen in cases of digital search. There 
is the possibility for the forensic investigators to find that the digital data the 
forensic investigators look for are contained by another digital system which 
can be accessed from the initial system. In this case, the prosecutor disposes 
immediately the preserving and copying them. The procedure requires the 
prosecutor will solicit completing the search warrant on the new digital system. 
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In those cases of carrying out digital search the investigation 
bodies must pay a special attention on this procedure including the number 
and size of digital system, the nature of wireless network and internal 
network as well in order to maintain unimpaired the digital data content. 
In this sense, the digital evidence will not be distorted or even modified. 
The detailed procedure of carrying out the digital search is provided by 
the Introductory Guide of Applying Legal Regulations regarding the 
Digital Criminality, drawing up by the Ministry of Communications 
and Information Technology48 in 2004.49 It provides aspects regarding 
the procedure of taking the digital system, shutting down the system, 
labeling the components, protecting against the data modification as well 
as transporting them to the laboratory. 
Within the digital search the forensic investigators will proceed 
to copying the digital data gathered from the digital system. It is advisable 
for the investigation bodies to proceed in double-sample copy, one of 
them will be sealed as a witness-evidence, and another one will be used 
in purpose to extract the digital data. The memory supports the digital 
data are copying on as well as the envelopes they are introduced in will be 
signed by the forensic investigators who participated in the digital search. 
Despite the penal procedure of digital search, the interest occurs 
on the person entitled to carrying out it. The code of penal procedure 
regulates that the competence in carrying out the digital search belongs 
to the forensic investigator that is working within the judicial bodies. 
The activity of digital search is made in the presence of the prosecutor. 
5. JurisprudEntial rEfErEncEs 
Case 1:
Once the Constitutional Court pronounced on the illegal use of 
defendants’ surveillance technologies by the other state’s bodies than the 
judicial ones, the courts of law in penal matters were entitled to decide 
48 The Introductory Guide of Applying Legal Regulations regarding the Digital 
Criminality, Bucharest: INTERNEWS RITI dot-GOV, 2004.
49 Olteanu, Gabriel Ion; Ruiu, Marin, Tactica criminalistica, Bucharest: AIT Lab-
oratories Publishing House, 2009, pp. 142-146. 
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upon the illegality of such administrative measures. Regarding this aspect, 
the law courts’ jurisprudence is very rich in decisions pronounced in cases 
in which such illegal surveillance technologies were used. 
Considering the fundamental principles of respecting private 
life and human rights entirely, the activity of investigation carrying out 
through infringing the defendant’s rights supposes the nullity of such 
activity. Regarding the principle of administering digital evidence they 
must be gathered through respecting legal provisions.50 During the pre-
trial court the defendant has formulated exceptions on the legality of 
administering digital evidence as well as on carrying out the activity of the 
investigation phase by the General Prosecutor Office attached to the High 
Court of Cassation and Justice – Direction of the Investigating Organized 
Crimes and Terrorism. The judge of preliminary court understood that the 
defendants were sent to trial due to committing the offence of initiating 
an organized criminal group incriminated by Article 367 (1) and (2) penal 
Code, offence of trafficking of minors incriminated by Article 211 (1) 
and (2) penal Code and trafficking of human beings also incriminated 
by penal Code at the Article 210 (1/a and b) thereof.
The prosecutor retained the fact that during the period of time 
between 2011 and 2016 the defendants set up an organized criminal 
group which was involved in ”recruiting, transporting, accommodating 
and sexual transnational exploiting of 5 minor women between the age 
of 15 and 17 years old and a number of 24 major women which came 
from disadvantaged families having a low level of education, with a very 
precarious material situation and different vulnerabilities”.51 
The prosecutor also stated in the indictment act that the group’s 
leader coordinated and surveyed entire criminal operation consisting in 
the women’ sexual exploitation which took place in Italy. The women 
were allured through the pretext of being engaged in well-paid labors in 
the destination country where they will receive a huge salary. Actually, 
the entire amount of money proceeded from criminal activities were 
sent in the defendants’ home country and distributed among the group 
50 Penal Decision no. 18 of 15 February 2017 of the Court of Law of Iasi, available 
online at: http://portal.just.ro/99/Lists/Jurisprudenta/DispForm.aspx?ID=378
51 Ibidem. 
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members. It has been established that during the period between 2011 
and 2015, an amount of 28.165 Euros was sent in Romania via Western 
Union services. The amount collected by defendants constitutes the 
proceeds of crime committed by themselves in Italy. 
De facto situation is proved through evidence gathered by technical 
means and administered in the penal case. The defendants invoked the 
exception of illegality of the investigation activities argued that they are 
illegal both from the point of view of the offence retained by prosecutor 
and their concordance with the act of indictment. On the one hand, 
regarding the illegal feature of the evidence administered in the penal case, 
the defendants requested from the judge of pre-trial court returning the 
case to the investigation phase as well as establishing nullity of the acts 
of intercepting private telephone calls due to the fact that, in accordance 
with the Constitutional Court decision no. 51/2016, they were carried 
out by the Romanian Service of Intelligence. 
The defendants admitted during the investigation phase the court 
of law authorized actions of intercepting their telephone calls, but they 
were carried out by another state body than the investigation one. For 
this reason, the only one sanction applied for those actions is the nullity 
of the procedural acts carried out in such circumstances. This means that 
the evidence gathered by digital means of technical surveillance is null. 
Considering from the constitutional point of view, the defendants 
emphasized that in the penal case Article 11 (2) Code of penal procedure 
on respecting the human dignity and private life was infringed. The pre-
trial judge appreciated that the role of this procedure is that of verifying 
the legality of evidence administered which ”institutes the pre-trial judge’s 
competence to verify the conformity of evidence administered during 
the investigation phase with the guarantees of the procedure fairness.”52 
The pre-trial judge stated there are vices of illegality. In this 
matter, the judge admitted the defendants’ right to defense has been 
respected with its entire legal elements. They have been also informed 
on the offence committed the indictment act is based on as well as the 
offences legal integration, as premises for the fair trial. 
52 Ibidem.
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Regarding the principle of legality and loyalty of administering 
evidence during the investigation phase, the pre-trial judge stated that 
the actions of technical surveillance lead with the Constitutional Court’s 
decision and provision of Article 102 (3) Code of penal procedure due 
to the fact that they were carried out by another administrative body 
instead of the judicial one. Taking into account this aspect, the pre-trial 
judge stated that the defendants “indicated concretely neither what kind 
of interceptions they invoked the illegality with not what kind of nullity 
would affect these interceptions as being illegal ones in accordance with 
the Constitutional Court Decision no. 51/2016 they are prevailed with”.53 
Case 2: 
In accordance with the Constitutional Court Decision no. 
302/201754 the legislative solution regulated by Article 281 (1/b) Code 
of penal procedure which does not provide the sanction of nullity in 
cases of infringing provisions regarding the investigation bodies’ 
procedural competence rationae persone and rationae materie was declared 
unconstitutionally. Moreover, infringing provisions on executing procedural 
measures of technical surveillance including the other specialized state 
bodies’ technical support is sanctioned by absolute nullity. 
De iure, the pre-trial judge of the High Court of Cassation and 
Justice admitted the defendant’s request and pre-trial exceptions regarding 
the illegality of the indictment act issued by the General Prosecutor 
Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice – The National 
Anticorruption Directorate regarding the offences description and their 
legal integration as well as regarding the means of evidence administered.55 
53 Ibidem.
54 Decision no. 302 of 4 May 2017 of the Constitutional Court on the excep-
tion of unconstitutionality of Article 281 (1/b) Code of penal procedure, 
available online at: https://ccr.ro/files/products/Decizie_302_2017.pdf (ac-
cessed on 22 May 2019)
55 Conclusion no. 31/C of 27 September 2018 of the High Court of Cassa-
tion and Justice, available online at: https://www.scj.ro/1093/Detalii-juris-
prudenta?customQuery%5B0%5D.Key=id&customQuery%5B0%5D.Val-
ue=147655 (accessed on 24 March 2019)
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The indictment act contains the prosecutor’s decision on the 
defendant’s procedural status of being sent to trial for committing the 
tax evasion offence incriminated by Article 9 (1/c) and (3) of Law no. 
241/200556 and carrying out illegal financial operations as commercial 
activities by an incompatible person, incriminated by Article 12 (a) of 
Law no. 78/200057. 
The defendant appealed the pre-trial judge’s conclusion arguing 
the fact that the fair trial principle is guaranteed through administering legal 
evidence. Moreover, defendant criticized the modality of administering 
evidence in the investigation phase from the point of view of the measures 
of technical surveillance illegality as exception also invoked by defendant. 
The court of law observed that technical measures of surveillance 
having as object intercepting and recording telephone calls and 
communications as well as intercepting and audio-video recording the 
conversations discussed in the ambient environment and localizing 
and surveying by GPS were authorized in accordance with Article 138 
Code of penal procedure. Initially, the provisions of Article 142 (1) 
Code of penal procedure regulates that “the prosecutor executes the 
technical surveillance order or can dispose it can be carried out by the 
investigation police body or specialized police officers or by the other 
state’s specialized bodies”. Once the Constitutional Court decision no. 
51/2016 entered into force the legal expression “or by the other state’s 
specialized bodies” is unconstitutional. 
The court of law admitted the defendant’s request and disposed to 
the Prosecutor Office to specify ”what the public authority executed the 
technical surveillance warrant in the current penal case and the implication 
of the Romanian Intelligence Service in the investigation activities, 
more particular what kind of these activities were carried out by the last 
institution”.58 The prosecutor issued the official response which stated 
that the technical surveillance warrants disposed by the competent court 
56 Law no. 241/2005 on preventing and combating tax evasion, published in the 
Official Journal no. 672 of 27 July 2005. 
57 Law no. 78/2000 on preventing, discovering and sanctioning offences of cor-
ruption, published in the Official Journal no. 219 of 18 May 2000. 
58 Conclusion no. 31/C of 27 September 2018 of the High Court of Cassation and 
Justice, available online at: https://www.scj.ro/1093/Detalii-jurisprudenta? 
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of law have been executed with the technical support of the Romanian 
Intelligence Service ”but the procedural reports of registering the results 
of technical surveillance activities have been drawn up in accordance 
with Article 143 Code of penal procedure by the judicial police officers 
within the Anticorruption National Directorate .”59 
Regarding the current investigation activity, it has been argued 
that the provisions of the Article 142 (1) Code of penal procedure 
were into force at the moment of disposing the special measures of 
technical surveillance both in the beginning and at the end of these 
activities. At the same time, the prosecutor pointed out that although 
the Romanian Intelligence Service was involved in the technical 
surveillance activities it did not carry out investigation activity during 
the investigation phase.
Taking into account the constitutional limitation in the penal case 
the legal provisions on carrying out the measures of technical surveillance 
have been infringed due to the fact that these activities were fulfilled by a 
state body having no competence in carrying out activities of investigation 
procedure. The situation produces the infringement of competence 
regulations that is sanctioned by absolute nullity. Moreover, in accordance 
with the Constitutional Court decision no. 302/2017 infringing the 
provisions of investigation bodies’ competence is also sanctioned by 
absolute nullity, its legal effects being regulated by Article 281 Code of 
penal procedure. 
Considering all these aspects stated above, the court of law 
decided removing the means of evidence and the supports that contain 
the result of the means of technical surveillance existed in the penal trial. 
At the same time, it stated removing all aspects related to these means of 
evidence and their content. For these reasons, the court of law admitted 
the defendant’s appeal, repealed the conclusions invoked and declared the 
absolute nullity of the measures of technical surveillance. In accordance 
with Article 102 (2-4) Code of penal procedure, the court of law decided 
customQuery%5B0%5D.Key=id&customQuery%5B0%5D.Value=147655 
(accessed on 24 March 2019)
59 Ibidem. 
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to remove the procedural reports of registering the results of technical 
surveillance activities from the penal case.60 
conclusions 
The criminality committed within the digital environment is the 
social phenomenon which refers to the diversity of criminal acts and 
activities the perpetrators commit. From a substantive penal law point 
of view, protecting such environment is carried out by special means 
of digital security.61 Nevertheless, in the field of penal procedure law 
a particular regulation regarding the serious crimes is also necessary. 
At present, the provisions regulated by the Code of penal 
procedure in Romania still creates difficulties in the judicial bodies’ 
activity of achieving the scope of the penal trial consisting in finding the 
judicial truth based on legal evidence. The serious drawbacks existed in 
the judiciary must be corroborated with the constitutional limitation 
imposed on the illegal procedure of gathering digital evidence carried 
out by the other state’s bodies than the investigation ones. 
Taking into account these aspects, a set of de lege ferenda 
proposals has been identified and advanced in purpose to improve the 
legal framework of solving the cases in criminal matters.
Basically, having in view the major deficiencies of the penal 
procedure legislation into force, the proposals refer to the following 
aspects. 
It is obviously that committing serious crimes62, a special 
aggravated procedure is imperatively to be implemented in the justice 
60 For the similar reference, see also Conclusion no. 31/C of 27 September 2018 
of the High Court of Cassation and Decision, available online at: https://
www.scj.ro/1094/Detalii-dosar?customQuery%5B0%5D.Key=id&custom-
Query%5B0%5D.Value=100000000316375 
61 Alecu, Gheorghe; Barbaneagra, Alexei, Reglementarea penală și investigarea 
criminalistică a infractiunilor din domeniul informatic, Bucharest: Pinguin Book 
Publishing House, 2006, pp. 188-215.
62 Gounev, Philip; Ruggiero, Vincenzo, Corruption and Organized Crime in Eu-
rope. Illegal Partnerships, London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Fran-
cis Group, 2012, pp. 4-12; Campana, Paolo, Understanding Then Responding 
1213
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, vol. 5, n. 3, p. 1189-1217, set.-dez. 2019.
https://doi.org/10.22197/rbdpp.v5i3.250 |
in criminal matters63, this kind of crimes to be solved on. The special 
procedure must be derogatory regulated from the ordinary penal 
procedure. It must regulate both the investigation and the judgment 
phases of penal trial. During the investigation phase, the main activity 
should take into account approaching the procedure of achieving:
- investigation of serious crimes, under the special aggravated 
procedure;
- aspects regarding the discovering, identifying, preserving, 
analyzing and administering digital evidence.
Among these activities, the legislator must focus its attention to 
administering digital evidence in order to regulate and implement it in 
the penal trial due to the fact that at present the Romanian legislation 
in criminal matters does not recognize de lege lata the possibility of 
administering digital evidence directly during the penal proceedings.64 
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